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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with two mechanisms for economic growth. The first is the ag-
glomeration of economic activities (Jacobs 1969, Lucas 1988, Krugman 1991, Glaeser et al.
1992). More specifically, industrialization and urbanization are two salient phenomena
which are closely intertwined in the development process for developing countries (see
e.g. Henderson 2005 and Michaels, Rauch, and Redding 2012). The second mechanism is
technology diffusion (Howitt 2000, Acemoglu, Zilibotti and Aghion 2006), which is fun-
damentally what underlies the convergence hypothesis. In developing countries, special
economic zones are often established as a means to promote economic growth, and the ra-
tionales are mainly these two mechanisms: to promote clustering of firms/industries and
to facilitate technology diffusion by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Manifest-
ing these ideas are the emergence of Shenzhen from a small fishing village to one of the
four top-tier cities in China and Iskandar Malaysia, which achieved significant economic
growth after its establishment in 2006.1
The two above-mentioned mechanisms are, however, not orthogonal, and we are in-
terested in understanding whether and how FDI affects overall patterns of industrial ag-
glomeration in a country. Firms tend to cluster for various agglomeration benefits.2 For-
eign firms (and hence FDI) also tend to cluster (Alfaro and Chen 2014). Thus, locations
with numerous foreign firms are presumably attractive for domestic firms due to tech-
nology diffusion and other agglomeration benefits such as input-output linkages among
foreign and domestic firms. Taken together, it is intuitive to conjecture that more FDI leads
to more industrial agglomeration.3
This paper aims to empirically test the above-mentioned conjecture. Specifically, we
explore a particular historical event to empirically examine the effect of FDI on industrial
agglomeration. China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the end of 2001.
1Before 1980, Shenzhen was a small fishing village, with virtually no foreign investment. In May 1980,
China’s State Council approved establishing the first special economic zone (SEZ) in China, the Shenzhen
SEZ. The zone is considered a testing ground for trade and FDI liberalization and tax reforms. To attract
foreign investment, the government provided preferential policies for foreign investors, for example, re-
ductions in corporate income tax and land use fees. The annual growth rate averaged between 1980 and
2001 for GDP of Shenzhen was 29.5 percent. The corresponding number for gross industrial output and
total exports was 46.4 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively. Regarding the case of Iskandar Malaysia, the
Malaysia government established the special economic zone of Iskandar Malaysia in November 2006. After
a decade, the zone had created about 700 thousand employment opportunities and the committed cumu-
lative investments reached 52.99 billion US dollars in 2016. The region’s GDP grew annually at 4.1 percent
from 2006 to 2010, and at about 7 percent after 2011 (Iskandar Regional Development Authority, 2016).
2See the discussion in the literature review below.
3This conjecture would be disproved if foreign firms become more dispersed after the FDI deregulation.
As mentioned, earlier empirical evidence shows that foreign firms tend to cluster. Furthermore, we find no
empirical evidence on this concern. See Section 5.4 for details.
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As a condition of accession, China was required to relax its controls on FDI entry: the ex-
tent of deregulation differed across industries. Specifically, China encouraged FDI entries
in around one quarter of its manufacturing industries, with the rest remaining mostly
status quo. Our data show that such differential deregulation of FDI generated different
degrees of influx of foreign capital (hence number of firms) across industries.
These variations in FDI deregulation across industries and time allow us to use a
difference-in-differences (DD) estimation approach. Specifically, we compare the degrees
of industrial agglomeration in the FDI deregulated industries with those in the status-
quo industries before and after the deregulation, which occurred in 2002, not long after
the WTO accession. The degree of industrial agglomeration is measured using a widely-
used index, the Ellison-Glaeser (EG) index (Ellison and Glaeser 1997). The identifying
assumption in estimating the causal effect of FDI deregulation is whether the deregu-
lated industries and the timing of the deregulation are randomly determined or not. The
empirical study starts with the check on the parallel pre-trends between the treatment
and control groups; it is shown that there is no difference in industrial agglomeration
between the treatment and the control group before the FDI deregulations. Second, we
control for the nonrandom selection of deregulated industries by carefully examining the
determinants of FDI deregulations. Third, we control for other concurrent policy reforms
that may affect industrial agglomeration. These policy reforms include tariff reductions,
restructuring and privatization of SOEs, place-based policies such as special economic
zones, and the Western Development Program. Conditional on a set of controls, the re-
laxation of FDI regulations is plausibly exogenous. We find a significantly negative effect
of FDI deregulation on industrial agglomeration, and this result is robust to a battery of
robustness checks (see Section 4 for details).
The results surprised us, as they are contrary to the above-mentioned conjecture.
To reconcile the empirical finding and the conventional wisdom behind the conjecture,
we develop a theory of FDI and industrial agglomeration based on two counter-veiling
forces. On the one hand, FDI brings in foreign firms that are more productive than do-
mestic firms. If domestic firms are located in the same region as the foreign firms, they
may receive technological spillover and thus have higher productivities on average than
the domestic firms that stay in the other region with fewer or no foreign firms.4 On the
other hand, the existence of transport cost between regions makes regions with more
firms more competitive, which means that the firms there enjoy lesser markups, sales,
and profits for the same given productivity. Therefore, FDI deregulation may increase
4In fact, technology diffusion in our model can be more broadly interpreted as any external benefit that
the presence of foreign firms brings to domestic ones.
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competition pressure in locations where foreign firms agglomerate, and this competition
pressure may discourage firms from locating there.
Our theory predicts a hump shape in the relation of industrial agglomeration with
foreign capital. When the size of the economy is small, technology diffusion attracts do-
mestic firms to where the foreign capital is located. At this stage, competition pressure is
small, and thus the competitive effect is dominated by the force of technology diffusion.
As the economy grows, competition pressure also grows, and productivity gaps shrink
due to the extensive technology diffusion that has already occurred. In this case, a further
influx of foreign capital induces dispersion rather than agglomeration. The former case
fits the stories of Shenzhen and Iskandar, whereas the latter case explains our empirical
results.
To test the mechanism of our theory, we estimate the effect of FDI deregulation on
markups, sales, and profits of firms. We do find that after 2002 the markups, sales, and
profits of firms in the deregulated industries are significantly lower than their counter-
parts in the status-quo industries. By repeating our benchmark estimation for the ex-
porter and non-exporter sub-samples separately, we find the effect of FDI deregulation
on industrial agglomeration to be much more pronounced for the non-exporters than the
exporters. This finding corroborates with our theory as non-exporters face more severe
domestic competition than exporters. Our mechanism is undermined if most of the influx
of foreign firms export, but we find no evidence of this.
An alternative explanation for our main empirical finding is based on a spatial politi-
cal competition story. That is, local governments in China have incentive to lure business,
and especially foreign firms for their spillover effects, to their regions to help GDP and
employment growth. FDI deregulation opens up new opportunities for the local govern-
ments to try to attract FDI in these newly deregulated industries. In this spatial political
competition, less agglomerated and less developed regions may have stronger incentives
to seize this new opportunity. Nevertheless, we do not find empirical support for this
story, as the location patterns of foreign firms are largely unaffected by FDI deregulation.
The last part of our empirical investigation is to look directly at the impact of FDI and
agglomeration on industrial growth. We find that FDI deregulation increases industrial
growth rate, but the dispersion induced by FDI deregulation reduces the positive effect
of FDI on growth rate by 16 to 19%. Consistent with our theory and previous empiri-
cal findings, combining FDI-promoting and agglomeration-promotion policies (such as
SEZs) may be worthwhile because FDI influx may cause dispersion and thereby dampen
growth potential.
Our literature review starts with the literature on (industrial) agglomeration. Vari-
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ous agglomeration forces operating at the industry level or across industries have been
well-understood in recent decades of development of theory and empirics in urban and
regional economics. These include knowledge spillover, labor pooling, input-output link-
ages, and many others. See Marshall (1920) for initial ideas on agglomeration. For mod-
ern development of related literature, see Duranton and Puga (2004) for a survey on the
theoretical literature, and Rothenthal and Strange (2004) on the empirical counterpart.
Less emphasized is the role of international trade and foreign direct investment. A few
recent studies point to the positive role of international trade on the agglomeration of eco-
nomic activities within a country (see, e.g., Rauch 1991; Fajgelbaum and Redding 2014;
Tombe and Zhu 2015; Redding 2016), but little work has been done on the role of FDI,
which is the focus of our work.
Some empirical literature focuses on the effects of FDI on domestic firms. Using
Venezuela data, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find empirical evidence that domestic firms
may benefit from foreign firms through channels such as knowledge spillover, input shar-
ing, and labor pooling, but they may lose market share to the more productive foreign
multinationals. Their findings generally corroborate our above-mentioned mechanism
tests. Alfaro and Chen (2018) decompose the aggregate industry productivity into within-
firm productivity effect and between-firm selection and reallocation effect, and find that
the selection and reallocation effect account for two-thirds of the effect of multination-
als on aggregate industry productivity. Using data from Mexico, Venezuela, and the US,
Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) study the effect of FDI on local wages. Aitken, Han-
son, and Harrison (1997) use Mexican plant-level data to study the effect of FDI on exports
by domestic firms. Using data from the Czech Republic, Kosová (2010) studies the effect
of FDI on firm selection. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to
identify the effect of FDI on industrial agglomeration in a country.
On the theory side, we note that our work is specifically on industrial agglomeration
as opposed to agglomeration in general. The canonical theories of agglomeration typi-
cally model situations when two sides of the markets (buyers and sellers) are both mobile;
e.g., when firms and people cluster together to form large regions or cities. See, for exam-
ples, Krugman (1991), Helpman (1998), Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002). However,
our focus here, as fits our regression specification and results, is on the location pattern of
firms in an industry. Thus, we use the partial-equilibrium framework of Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008) and allow only the firms to be mobile, i.e., we assume workers/consumers
are immobile. After all, the location pattern of a four-digit industry5 is unlikely to affect
the location pattern of the population or the overall economy. Our theoretical approach
5There are 424 4-digit CIC industries. For details, see Section 2.2.
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also fits our empirical measure in the EG index, which takes the spatial distribution of
population or overall economic activities as given. To the best of our knowledge, our
theory is the first on how FDI affects industrial agglomeration.
A related point is on the role of the competition effect. In the theories of agglomera-
tion, the competition effect may be conducive to agglomeration because consumers enjoy
lower prices (e.g., Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse 2002). But under our setup to study the
location pattern of an industry, the competition effect simply discourages agglomeration
of firms. Also related is the study by Behrens, Gaigne, Ottaviano, and Thisse (2007) who
show geographic dispersion of the industry when trade becomes more open. Our theory
differs from theirs as we focus on FDI and incorporate technology diffusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the data and the back-
ground of the FDI deregulation in 2002. Section 3 specifies the estimation strategy. Section
4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides a theoretical explanation for the em-
pirical results and conducts mechanism tests. Section 6 investigates the effect of FDI and
industrial agglomeration on industrial growth rate. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Regulations of FDI in China
In December 1978, China’s then-leader Deng Xiaoping initiated an open door policy in-
tended to promote foreign trade and investment. The policy changed dramatically the sit-
uation under the rigid central planning in force before 1978. At that time foreign-invested
enterprises were almost completely absent. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s a series
of laws on FDI and implementation measures were introduced and revised.
 In July 1979, a “Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture” was passed to attract
foreign direct investment.
 In September 1983, “Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures” were issued by China’s State Council of China. They were
revised in January 1986, December 1987, and April 1990.
 In April 1986 the “Law on Foreign Capital Enterprises” was enacted.
 In October 1986, “Policies on Encouragement of Foreign Investment” were issued
by the State Council.
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Foreign-invested enterprises enjoy preferential policies on taxes, land use, and other
matters, often in the form of policies for the special economic zones. They were expected
to bring advanced technology and management know-how to China and to promote
China’s integration into the world economy. As a result of those laws and implemen-
tation measures, China experienced rapid growth in FDI inflow from 1979 to 1991. After
Deng Xiaoping took a tour of Southern China in the spring of 1992 to revive a slowing
economy, the FDI inflows to China grew even faster, reaching US$ 27.52 billion in 1993.
Most significantly, there were policies designating which industries were permitted
to accept foreign direct investment. In June 1995, the central government promulgated
a “Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries” (henceforth, the Cat-
alogue), which, together with the modifications made in 1997, became the government
guideline for regulating FDI inflows. Specifically, the Catalogue classified products into
four categories in which (i) FDI was supported, (ii) FDI was permitted, (iii) FDI was re-
stricted, or (iv) FDI was prohibited.
After China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in November 2001, the central
government substantially revised the Catalogue in March 2002, and then made minor
revisions in November 2004.6 This study exploits the plausibly exogenous relaxation of
FDI regulations upon China’s WTO accession at the end of 2001 to identify the effect of
FDI on industrial agglomeration.
2.2 Data
Panel Data on Industrial Firms.—The main data used in this study are from the Annual Sur-
veys of Industrial Firms (ASIFs) conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
during the 1998–2007 period.7 These surveys cover all of the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and all of the non-SOEs firms with annual sales exceeding 5-million Chinese yuan
(about US$827,000). The number of firms covered in the surveys varies from approxi-
mately 162,000 to approximately 270,000. The dataset has more than 100 variables, in-
cluding the basic information for each surveyed firm, such as its identification number,
location code, and industry affiliation. It is supplemented with financial and operational
information extracted from accounting statements, such as sales, employment, materials,
fixed assets, and the total wage bill.
6The National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce jointly issued the
fifth and sixth revised versions of the Catalogue in October 2007 and December 2011, which are outside the
period studied.
7These data have been widely used by economics researchers in recent years, e.g., Lu, Lu, and Tao (2010),
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012), and Lu and Yu (2015).
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For our study, we need precise industry and location information about our sample
firms. In 2003, a new classification system for industry codes (GB/T 4754-2002) was
adopted in China to replace the old classification system (GB/T 4754-1994) that had been
used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve consistency in the industry codes over the entire pe-
riod studied (1998–2007), the concordance table constructed by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck,
and Zhang (2012) is exploited to convert all of the data to the GB/T 4754-2002 system.8
Meanwhile, during the sample period studied there were several changes in the county
or prefecture9 codes in the data set, due to changes in administrative boundaries.10 Using
the national standard (GB/T 2260-1999) promulgated at the end of 1998 as the benchmark
code, we convert the region codes of all of the firms to that standard to achieve consis-
tency over the entire period studied.
The outcome variable, the degree of industrial agglomeration, is measured by apply-
ing the method of Ellison and Glaeser (1997). Ellison and Glaeser’s index (henceforth, the
EG index) is constructed as
EGi 
Gi   (1 
P
r
x2r)Hi
(1 P
r
x2r)(1 Hi)
;
where Gi 
P
r
(xr   sir)2 with xr the share of total output of all industries in region r, and
sir the share of output of region r in industry i; and Hi 
P
j
h2j is the Herfindahl index of
industry i, with hj the output share of a particular firm j in industry i.
For a given industry, the EG index measures the degree of spatial concentration rela-
tive to the case where the firms in that industry are randomly assigned to locations (the
metaphor is a dartboard approach). In the main analysis, we measure the EG indexes by
using prefectures as the geographic unit. (There are around 380 prefectures in China.)
To check whether the findings are sensitive to the geographic unit selected (the so-called
8One potential problem with the ASIF data is that, for firms with multiple plants located in regions
other than their domiciles, the information about the satellite plants might be aggregated with that of the
domicile-based plants. According to Article 14 of China’s Company Law, for a company to set up a plant
in a region other than its domicile “it shall file a registration application with the company registration
authority, and obtain the business license.” So if a firm has six plants located in different provinces, they are
treated as six different observations belonging to six different regions. Thus a firm in this study’s data set
is essentially a plant.
9The most common form of the prefecture is the so-called “prefectural-level city” (di-ji-shi). Prefectures
that are not prefectural-level cities typically cover rural areas. The terminology “prefectural-level city” is
the official name for such jurisdictions. This can be confusing, because such prefectures are much larger
than a metropolitan area and cover large areas of rural land. In this paper, both types are simply called
prefectures.
10For example, new counties were established, while existing counties were combined into larger ones or
even elevated to prefectures.
8
modifiable area unit problem), the EG indexes are also computed using counties as the
geographic unit. (There are around 2,800 counties in China.)
Data on China’s FDI Regulations.—In compiling information about changes in FDI reg-
ulations upon China’s accession to the WTO, the 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue
are compared matching the product level in the Catalogue with ASIF industries (Lu, Tao,
and Zhu 2017). As has been explained, the Catalogue lists products (i) where foreign di-
rect investment was supported (the supported category), (ii) where foreign direct invest-
ment was restricted (the restricted category), and (iii) where foreign direct investment
was prohibited (the prohibited category). Products not listed constitute a permitted cate-
gory. We compare the 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue to identify for each product
whether or not there had been a change in the applicable FDI regulations upon China’s
accession to the WTO. Each product is then assigned to one of three outcomes: (i) FDI
became more welcome (FDI encouraged products), (ii) FDI became less welcome (FDI
discouraged products) or (iii) No change in FDI regulations between 1997 and 2002.11
The changes in FDI regulations were then aggregated from the product level of the
Catalogue to the industry level of the ASIF. This led to four possible outcomes:
1. Encouraged Industries: For all of a 4-digit CIC industry’s Catalogue products there
was either a relaxation of FDI restrictions or no change.
2. Discouraged Industries: For all of a 4-digit CIC industry’s Catalogue products there
was either a tightening of FDI regulations or no change.
3. No-change Industries: There was no change in the FDI regulations applicable to any
of a 4-digit CIC industry’s Catalogue products.
4. Mixed Industries: FDI regulations were tightened for some of a 4-digit CIC indus-
try’s Catalogue products but loosened for others.
Among the 424 4-digit CIC industries, 112 are classified as encouraged (the treatment
group in the study’s regression analyses), 300 are categorized as no-change industries
(the control group in the regressions), 7 are considered discouraged, and 5 are mixed.
The latter two groups are excluded from the analysis.12
One concern here is that regional variation in FDI deregulation might affect the geo-
graphic distribution of economic activity. After carefully examining the 2002 Catalogue,
11See Appendix A for more detail about how the 1997 and 2002 catalogues are compared and how Cata-
logue products are matched with ASIF industries.
12The results remain robust when the discouraged industries are included in the control group. See
Section 4.3.
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however, as well as other policies related to FDI issued in 2002, we do not find any
changes in the regional aspects of the FDI entry regulations. Actually, in 1997, the year in
which the Catalogue was promulgated, the State Council also issued the “Termination of
Unauthorized Local Examination and Approval of Commercial Enterprises with Foreign
Investment” which forbid local discretions with respect to FDI.
Descriptive Statistics.—Table 1 reports the EG indexes calculated at the prefecture level
across the 2-digit industries over the entire sample period (1998–2007), the pre-WTO pe-
riod (1998–2001), and the post-WTO period (2002–2007). The three most geographically
concentrated industries in the 1998–2007 period are Smelting & Pressing of Nonferrous
Metals, Leather, Furs, Down & Related Products, and Food Processing. The industries
with the lowest degree of agglomeration are Tobacco Processing, Printing Industry, and
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products.
[Insert Table 1 here]
From the pre-WTO period to the post-WTO period there were substantial changes in
the degree of agglomeration across the industries. The Chemical Fiber industry witnessed
the fastest growth in agglomeration, followed by Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office
Equipment, and then Transport Equipment. Tobacco Processing, Petroleum Processing &
Coking, and Medical & Pharmaceutical Products experienced decreased agglomeration.
Table 2 compares the changes in foreign equity share in Panel A, and the changes in
the share of number of foreign firms in Panel B, before and after the WTO accession for
the treatment and the control group. There were significant increases in both the foreign
equity share and the share of number of foreign firms for the treatment industries (in
which FDI was encouraged) than for the control industries (where FDI entry regulations
were unchanged).
[Insert Table 2 here]
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Specification
To identify the effect of changes in FDI regulations on industrial agglomeration, we use
variations across industries in the changes in FDI regulations upon China’s WTO acces-
sion: a DD estimation framework. Specifically, we compare the degree of agglomeration
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in the treatment group (the encouraged industries) with that in the control group (the
no-change industries) before and after China’s WTO accession at the end of 2001.
The specification for the DD estimation is
yit = i + Treatmenti  Post02t + X0it+ t + "it; (1)
where i, and t denote the 4-digit industry, and year, respectively; yit measures the agglom-
eration (the EG index) of industry i in year t; i is the industry fixed effect controlling for
time-invariant industry characteristics; t is the year fixed effect controlling for macroeco-
nomic shocks that affect all industries such as population distribution and labor mobility;
and "it is the error term. To address the potential serial correlation and heteroskedastic-
ity issues, we calculate the standard errors clustered at the industry level (see Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
TreatmentiPost02t is the regressor of interest, capturing the FDI regulation changes
in industry i and year t, where Treatmenti indicates whether industry i belongs to the en-
couraged industries; and Post02t is a dummy indicating the post-WTO period, i.e., Post02t =
1 if t  2002, and 0 if t < 2002. To isolate the effect of FDI regulation changes, we control
for a vector of time-varying industry characteristics Xit (to be explained later) which may
be correlated with Treatmenti  Post02t.
3.2 Identifying Assumption and Checks
The identifying assumption of the DD estimation specification (1) is that, conditional on
a list of controls, our regressor of interest (Treatmenti  Post02t) is uncorrelated with
the error term ("it), i.e., cov (Treatmenti  Post02t; "itjWit) = 0, where Wit represents
all of the controls (i, Xit, t). There are only two possible sources of violation of this
identifying assumption; if either cov (Post02t; "itjWit) 6= 0 or cov (Treatmenti; "itjWit) 6=
0. We discuss these possible estimation biases in sequence, and also our checks.
Nonrandom Timing of Treatment. If cov (Post02t; "itjWit) 6= 0, the timing of the FDI
deregulation was non-random. All of the analyses include year fixed effects that remove
all the common differences across years. Nonrandom selection of treatment timing would
have biased the estimates if, for example, the Chinese government had chosen to change
the FDI regulations in 2002 knowing that treatment and control industries would become
different at that moment.
As discussed in the previous subsection, however, the FDI deregulation in 2002 was
one of the requirements of China’s WTO accession, the negotiation of which was very
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lengthy and rather uncertain prior to 2001. First, it took more than 15 years of exhaustive
negotiations with the 150 WTO member countries for China to join the WTO. Second,
although China signed a breakthrough agreement with the United States in November
1999 and an agreement with the European Union in May 2000, several remaining issues
such as farm subsidies were still unresolved in mid-2001. There could thus have been
no anticipation of China’s WTO accession by the end of 2001. Nevertheless, a robust-
ness check is performed following Jensen and Oster (2009). Specifically, an additional
control—Treatmenti One Y ear Before WTO Accessiont—is included in the regression.
A significant coefficient for that additional control variable would indicate possible ex-
pectation effects.
Another potential bias arising from the treatment timing is that other on-going policy
reforms at the time of China’s WTO accession might have affected industrial agglomer-
ation, thereby confounding the effect of FDI on industrial agglomeration. At the time of
China’s WTO accession there were substantial tariff reductions by China and its trading
partners which affected the use of imported inputs and access to export markets. To con-
dition out the tariff reduction effects, we include the interactions between year dummies
and various tariffs (specifically, China’s output and input tariffs, and its export tariffs) in
2001 in Xit.13 Another important policy reform in the early 2000s was the restructuring
and privatization of SOEs. To control for the possibility that the extent of SOE restructur-
ing and privatization differed across industries and affected our outcomes, we add the in-
teraction between the year dummies and industry-level SOE share in 2001 in Xit. China’s
special economic zones were specifically designed to attract foreign direct investments,
and to alleviate this concern, we include an additional control, the interaction between
the year dummies and the share of industry output from the special economic zones in
2001. China also launched a Western Development Program in 2000 to foster economic
growth in its western regions, and we further add in the regressions the interaction be-
tween the year dummies and the share of industry output in the western regions in 2001
to control for the effect of that program on industrial agglomeration.14
13The tariff data for HS-6 products are obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution database.
Mapping HS-6 products to ASIF 4-digit industries through the concordance table from China’s National
Bureau of Statistics allows calculating a simple average output tariff for each industry. The input tariffs
are constructed as a weighted average of the output tariffs, using as the weight the share of the inputs in
the output value from the China’s 2002 input-output table. The export tariff is a weighted average of the
destination countries’ tariffs on Chinese imports, using China’s exports to each destination country as the
weight.
14The Western Development Program covered the provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi,
Sichuan, and Yunnan, the autonomous regions of Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang,
and the municipality of Chongqing.
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Nonrandom Selection of the Treatment Group. If cov (Treatmenti; "itjWit) 6= 0, that chal-
lenges the comparability of the treatment and control groups. Specifically, the selection
of which industries to open up to FDI upon the WTO accession was not random. The
encouraged industries and the no-change industries could have been experiencing different
trends before the WTO accession and those differences might have generated different
outcome trends across industries in the post-WTO period.
To alleviate the identification concern due to the nonrandom selection of treatment
industries, we follow the approach proposed by Gentzkow (2006). First, we carefully
characterize the important determinants of the changes in FDI regulations upon the WTO
accession. The State Council issued the “Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign
Investment” in 2002 and listed several reasons/criteria for why and how the government
modified the Catalogue and relaxed the FDI regulations in 2002. As shown in Lu, Tao, and
Zhu (2017), four determinants are identified at the four-digit industry level: new product
intensity, export intensity, number of firms, and the average age of firms in the industry.15
There is also a concern that the choice of industries for FDI deregulation could have
been related to the SOE reform during the late 1990s. During the reform, some industries
were not deregulated due to political favoritism. FDI deregulation provides the reform-
ers another opportunity to liberalize more industries, and those are likely be industries
associated with politically weaker interest groups. The change in the share of SOEs in
an industry between 1998 and 2001 serves as an indicator of the industry-government
connection, a potential determinant of FDI deregulation.
Let the four determinants from the Catalogue be measured in 2001 as well as the
change in SOE share between 1998 and 2001 denoted as Zi2001. We then add interac-
tions between Zi2001 and the year dummies (Zi2001  t) in Xit to control flexibly for post-
WTO differences in the time paths of the outcomes caused by the endogenous selection
of industries for changes in their FDI regulations. Furthermore, we control for time-
varying industry characteristics to balance different industries. Specifically, we include in
Xit factors which may have affected industrial agglomeration. Included are knowledge
spillovers (measured by industrial productivity), input sharing (measured by intermedi-
ate inputs as a share of output), labor market pooling (measured by wage premiums),
scale economies (measured by average firm size), and a geographic factor (measured by
15New product intensity is the ratio of new product output to total output. Export intensity is the ratio of
total exports to total output. New product intensity and number of firms are statistically positively corre-
lated with the FDI deregulation, while export intensity and industry average age are negatively correlated.
The positive correlation of new product intensity indicates that more innovative industries are more likely
to be deregulated. Also, infant industries (those with smaller firm ages) and industries with less export
intensity are more likely to be deregulated. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion on the selection of the
determinants of FDI deregulation.
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employment in the coastal area). We further control for the channel of vertical FDI (i.e.,
backward and forward FDI) to account for potential influences of the FDI in upstream
and downstream industries on the agglomeration of own industries.16
A Placebo Test. We formalize the identification issues and carry out a placebo test with
randomly assigned reform status (for similar exercises, see, for example, Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft, 2009; La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea, 2012). We decompose the error term into
two parts: "it = !it + ~"it, such that
cov (Treatmenti  Post02t; !itjWit) 6= 0
and cov (Treatmenti  Post02t; ~"itjWit) = 0:
All of the identification issues are then confined to omitted variable !it. Then ^ is such
that
plim^ =  + ; (2)
where   cov(TreatmentiPost02t;!itjWit)
var(TreatmentiPost02tjWit) . And ^ 6=  if  6= 0. To check whether the results
are biased due to the omitted variable !it, we conduct a placebo test by randomly generat-
ing the industry and time variations in the changes in FDI entry regulations. Specifically,
112 industries are first selected randomly from the total of 412 industries in the regression
sample and assigned as encouraged industries. A year between 1999 and 2006 is then ran-
domly chosen (to ensure at least one year before the treatment and one year after WTO
accession is included for the DD analysis). Then, we create false treatment groups and false
implementation years from these two randomizations, i.e., Treatmentfalsei Postfalset . The
randomization ensures that Treatmentfalsei Postfalset should have no effect on industrial
agglomeration (i.e., false = 0); otherwise, it indicates the existence of the omitted variable
!it. This random data generation process is repeated 500 times to avoid contamination by
any rare events and to improve the power of the test.17
Colombia Instruments. Despite of all these validity exercises, one may still be concerned
about the endogeneity that remains in this research setting. The validity checks may not
have exhausted all the determinants of FDI deregulation, and remaining uncontrolled se-
lection variables may generate post-treatment differences between the treated and control
16Following Javorcik (2004), backward FDI is
P
k if k 6=i ik  Treatmentk  t, and forward FDI isP
m ifm 6=i im  Treatmentm  t. Here, ik is the ratio of industry i’s output supplied to sector k, and
im is the ratio of inputs purchased by industry i from industry m. Information on ik and im is compiled
from China’s 2002 input–output table.
17To be specific, we conduct the placebo test by estimating the following equation: yit =
+falseTreatmentfalsei  Postfalset + X
0
it + t + it. The controls (i;X
0
it; t) are the same as those in
the benchmark estimation (1).
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industries, biasing the estimates. To further address such concerns, we adopt an instru-
mental variable estimation in the spirit of Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2011) to identify the
effect of FDI liberalization on industrial agglomeration. The instruments are Colombian
industry-level characteristics, i.e., export intensity, industry age, and number of firms
corresponding to the determinants of China’s FDI regulation changes, interacted with
Post02t. For the construction of the Colombia instruments, the industry-level measures
of export intensity, age and number of firms are calculated based on Colombian plant-
level data from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica. The measures
are averaged over 1981 to 1991 for the median firm in each industry.18 The instruments are
potentially correlated with the FDI deregulation in China because they reflect relatively
similar industry characteristics of the corresponding Chinese industries. We test the rele-
vance condition by examining the significance of the instruments in the first-stage of the
IV estimation. The instruments are unlikely to be correlated with the error term because
bilateral trade and FDI between China and Colombia in the 1980s were very small, in-
dicating that there are no close international comovement relationships between Chinese
and Colombian industries.19
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Graphical Results
To illustrate the validity of our identification strategy, we plot, in Figure 1, the time trends
in the difference in industrial agglomeration (measured by the EG index) between the
encouraged industries and no-change industries, conditional on a set of controls in (1). It is
clear that in the pre-treatment period the treatment and control groups show quite similar
trends. This alleviates the concern that our treatment and control groups are systemati-
cally different ex ante, which lends support to the idea that the DD identifying assumption
is satisfied.
Meanwhile, in the post-treatment period, the treatment group experienced a signifi-
cant decline in the degree of agglomeration compared with the control group, indicating
that the relaxation of FDI regulations had a negative effect on industrial agglomeration.
18Note that the lack of information on Colombian firm-level new products and R&D investments prevent
using new product ratio as an instrument for the regressor of interest. Also, the industry classifications of
the Colombian data (ISIC revision 2) and Chinese data (the Chinese Industry Classification, as mentioned
earlier) are different. To obtain consistency in industry classification, the ISIC revision 2 data are first con-
verted to revision 3 using a concordance from the UN Nations Statistics Division, and then converted to the
Chinese Industry Classification using a concordance published by Judith and Lovely (2010).
19Colombia’s exports to China from 1981 to 1991 averaged 0.07% of those from the U.S.
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Figure 1: Effects of FDI regulation changes on industrial agglomeration
4.2 Main Results
The DD estimation results are reported in Table 3. We start with a DD specification that
includes only the industry and year fixed effects in Column 1. Then, we stepwisely in-
clude a set of controls as elaborated in the previous section. The inclusion of the controls
allows isolating the effect of FDI from other confounding factors such as the endogenous
selection of industries for changes in FDI regulations upon the WTO accession and other
on-going policy reforms (tariff reductions, SOE reform, special economic zones, and the
Western Development Program) occurring around the same period. Specifically, interac-
tions between the year dummies and potential determinants of changes in FDI regulations
are reported in Column 2. Interactions between year dummies and tariff reductions, and
between year dummies and SOE share are included in Columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Column 5 adds the interaction between between the year dummies and the share of in-
dustry output from the special economic zones in 2001. Column 6 adds the interaction
between between year dummies and the share of industry output from the western re-
gions in 2001. Time-varying industry characteristics are added in Column 7. The extent
of backward and forward FDI is added as a control in Column 8.
We consistently find that our regressor of interest, Treatmenti  Post02t, is statisti-
cally significant and negative, implying that FDI liberalization has a negative effect on
industrial agglomeration. This also echoes the message in Figure 1.
[Insert Table 3 here]
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Figure 2: Distribution of estimated coefficients in the placebo test
4.3 Robustness Checks
Randomly Assigned Policy Reform.—As discussed in the previous section, we conduct a
placebo test by randomly generating the industry and time variations in the changes in
FDI entry regulations. Figure 2 shows a histogram and the kernel density of the distri-
bution of the estimates from the 500 randomized assignments. The distribution of the
estimates is centered around zero (mean value  0:00008) with a standard deviation of
0:006. In addition, the true estimate (i.e.,  0:023) lies below all 500 estimates. Combined,
these observations suggest that the negative and significant effect of FDI on industrial
agglomeration is unlikely to be driven by unobserved variables.
IV Estimation. The IV estimation result is presented in Table 4, with the first-stage
estimates in Column 1 and the second-stage estimates in Column 2. The first-stage esti-
mation result shows that the Colombia instruments are statistically significant with the
changes in FDI regulations. The Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S
statistic, which offer reliable statistical inferences in a weak instrument setting, are both
significant. These results confirm the relevance condition of the instruments. Further-
more, the Hansen J statistic fails to be significant, confirming the joint validity of the full
instrument set. Turning to our regressor of interest, Treatmenti  Post02t, the coefficient
remains negative and statistically significant, indicating that FDI has a negative effect on
17
industrial agglomeration.20
[Insert Table 4 here]
Discouraged Industries Included in the Control Group.—In Column 1 of Table 5, we en-
large the control group by including the discouraged industries. The results remain simi-
lar to the benchmark results.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Alternative Measures of Agglomeration.—In Column 2 of Table 5, we repeat our analysis
using an alternative measure of agglomeration—an EG index calculated using the county
as the geographic unit. Consistently, we find that Treatmenti  Post02t is negative and
statistically significant, implying that the benchmark results are not driven by the specific
measure of industrial agglomeration.
Expectation Effect.—In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we add to the regression an ad-
ditional control, Treatmenti  One Y ear Before WTO Accession, to check whether or
not the degree of industrial agglomeration changes in anticipation of the changes in the
FDI regulations upon WTO accession. The coefficient of the regressor of interest remains
negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of the Treatmenti  One
Y ear Before WTO Accession term is statistically insignificant, with magnitude close to
0. These results indicate that the treatment and control groups are comparable in the
pre-treatment period and there is no expectation effect.
5 A Theory of Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial
Agglomeration
This section provides a theory to comprehend our empirical results. The conventional
expectation of a positive relationship between FDI and industrial agglomeration is inti-
mately linked with ideas about technology spillovers and various examples of successful
SEZ stories. Such expectation can be reconciled with these empirical results by consider-
ing more closely the interplay between technology diffusion and competition.21
20Note that the IV estimator has the same direction as the DD estimator, but they differ in magnitude.
Essentially, the IV estimator identifies the local average treatment effect while the DD estimator captures the
average treatment effect. To assess the external validity and gauge the economic magnitude of the results,
the DD estimator is used as the benchmark.
21The competition here is product market competition. We choose to focus on product markets rather
than competition in factor markets because that is how industries are defined. Also, factor market compe-
tition is generally across the board among industries within a region. The overall pattern of factor market
competition across regions in a given year should already be taken care of by the year fixed effect.
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Note first that technology diffusion can be interpreted more generally. There are var-
ious benefits that domestic firms can receive from the presence of foreign firms. Apart
from technology spillovers, there are input-output linkage and labor pooling. We take a
simple approach to model these various benefits to domestic firms by technology diffu-
sion, i.e., the domestic firms become more productive when locating near foreign firms.
On the other hand, whereas FDI deregulation implies more FDI inflows, the number
of firms increases, and this brings fiercer competition which also affects firms’ location
choices.
When the scale of the industry (or the entire economy) is small, which is often the case
for developing countries in the early stage of development, firm productivities tend to be
low and competition is not fierce. In that situation, domestic firms can benefit tremen-
dously from FDI, and FDI deregulation fosters industrial agglomeration. However, once
the industry has grown sufficiently large, the productivity gap may have already nar-
rowed and competition is fiercer. The benefits that domestic firms might hope to receive
from foreign firms then become small, while the already fierce competition encourages
dispersion of firms in the face of an influx of foreign capital.
As fitting to our empirical results from industry-level regressions, labor is assumed
to be immobile as each particular industry has only negligible influence on the overall
distribution of labor force or population. We thus focuse on “industrial agglomeration”
rather than “agglomeration” of both population and firms. Without mobility of workers
or consumers, competition entails negative incentives for firms’ location choices, as firms
typically choose to go to places with less fierce competition.22
5.1 Model
To incorporate competition effect in an analytically tractable way, our model builds on
Melitz and Ottaviano’s (2008) modeling of heterogeneous firms and variable markups.
Consider a country with two regions, indexed by i = 1; 2. A mass of immobile workers
Li live and work in region i such that L1+ L2 = L. Suppose for some reason that there
are more foreign firms in region 1. That may attract domestic firms to locate in region 1 in
hopes of technology diffusion, but region 1 may also become more competitive, and some
firms may want to leave. To highlight the tradeoff between technology diffusion and
competitive effects, assume foreign firms can only be located in region 1. We can think of
this assumption as SEZs or broader policy restrictions/incentives targeting foreign firms.
22When labor is mobile, pro-competitive effects can be an agglomeration force, as more firms in a location
can lower product prices and thus attract consumers and workers to move to that location, too. See, e.g.,
Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002).
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We assume that domestic firms are freely mobile. Empirically, we find no evidence that
the location pattern of foreign firms become more dispersed due to FDI deregulation. See
Section 5.4 for details.23
5.1.1 Consumption
Assume that any worker living in region i consumes a set of differentiated products in-
dexed by ! and a homogeneous good, which is set to be the numeraire. She solves the
following utility maximization problem:
max
q0;qji(!)
Ui = q0 + 
X
j
Z
!2
j
qji(!)d!   
2
X
j
Z
!2
j
q2ji(!)d!  

2
 X
j
Z
!2
j
qji(!)d!
!2
s:t: q0 +
X
j
Z
!2
j
pji(!)qji(!)d! = yi + q0;
where 
j is the set of differentiated products produced in region j, qji (!) is her demand
for the goods produced in region j with price pji (!), q0 is the amount of the numeraire
good consumed, and q0 is the per person endowment of the numeraire good. The posi-
tive parameters  and  capture the substitution between the differentiated products and
the numeraire: A larger  or a smaller  indicates greater willingness to pay for any dif-
ferentiated product in terms of the numeraire. The parameter  > 0 captures the degree
of product differentiation between the varieties: the larger , the more differentiated the
products are. When  = 0, they are perfect substitutes.
Each worker is endowed with a unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to the
firms in the region where she resides. Assume q0 is sufficiently large so that the consump-
tion q0 is always positive. Each worker also owns an equal share of all the domestic capital
KH (H stands for home). Thus, her total income is yi = wi + K
H
L
ri, where ri is the rental
rate of capital in region i and is endogenously determined.
As shown in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), there exist choke prices pmi such that the
individual demand is
qcji =
(
1

(pmi   pji) pji  pmi
0 pji > p
m
i
: (3)
23If one were to assume the foreign firms to be mobile, the resulting equilibrium would be one in which
the numbers of foreign and domestic firms are proportional to the population’s distribution. That is because
our model has no built-in agglomeration force. One can nevertheless incorporate standard agglomeration
economies to generate an innate agglomeration, but all of the results should still hold, because an uneven
distribution of foreign firms entails more technology diffusion in region 1. Such a model would, however,
be much more complicated while offering little new insight.
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Following a procedure similar to that of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the choke price here
is given by
pmi =
 + Pi
 + Ni
,
where
Pi 
X
j
Z
!2
cji
pji(!)d!. (4)
The price elasticity of demand for positive qcji is "ji =  
@qcji
@pji
pji
qcji
=

pmi
pji
  1
 1
. For a given
price pji, a larger number of competing firms Ni lowers the choke price and induces an
increase in "ji, indicating fiercer competition.
5.1.2 Production
The numeraire goods q0 are produced using one-to-one constant-returns technology, and
freely traded between the two regions. Thus w1 = w2 = 1. For the differentiated sector, 
units of capital are required to set up a firm in any region. Upon hiring  units of capital,
each entrant in region i generates a distinct product and draws its unit labor requirement
c (i.e., the marginal cost or the inverse of productivity) from a given distribution Gsi (c),
s = H;F . As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the choke price in a region i determines the
selection cutoff ci such that entrants in i with c > ci will exit.
The standard iceberg trade cost assumption is also made: for each good !,  ji units
must be shipped in order to deliver 1 unit to region i from region j. For simplicity, we
assume symmetric trade costs, and that trading locally is free. Thus,  ji =  > 1 if j 6= i,
and  ji = 1 if j = i.
The total capital K in this country consists of domestic capital KH and foreign capital
(FDI) KF . We assume that KF is entirely located in region 1 and is immobile. KH is
mobile. Denote the number of entrant firms in region i as NEi . The total number of
entrants nationwide is then NE  NE1 + NE2 = K
F+KH1

+
KH2

=
K

. By choosing units for
capital, we can normalize  to 1. Define the fraction of surviving firms in region 1 as
f  K
FGF1
 
cD1

+KH1 G
H
1
 
cD1

KFGF1 (c
D
1 ) +K
H
1 G
H
1 (c
D
1 ) +K
H
2 G
H
2 (c
D
2 )
:
It is actually easier to work with the ratio of surviving firms between the two regions:
  K
FGF1
 
cD1

+KH1 G
H
1
 
cD1

KH2 G
H
2 (c
D
2 )
, (5)
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which has a one-to-one mapping with f such that f = 
1+
and is increasing in . We
are interested in how FDI affects the spatial distribution of firms in the two regions, or
equivalently, how the equilibrium value of , denoted as e, responds to changes in the
amount of capital.
If there is no technology diffusion, then regardless of the location, a firm of type s
draws its cost c from a distribution given by
Gs (c) =
 c
cM;s

; c 2 [0; cM;s]; s 2 fH;Fg.
We assume cM;F  cM;H to reflect the technological advantage of foreign firms over home
firms. With technology diffusion in region 1, the domestic firms in region 1 draw from
GH1 (c) =

c
cM;H1

; c 2 [0; cM;H1 ];
where
cM;H1 = c
M;F + e K
F  
cM;H   cM;F  ;  > 0:
Therefore, if KF = 0, cM;H1 = cM;H , and if KF1 ! 1, cM;H1 = cM;F . That is, more FDI
improves the productivity of domestic firms in region 1, but still leaves it lower than that
of the foreign firms. Meanwhile, foreign firms still draw from the distribution with cM;F ,
and the home firms in region 2 draw from the distribution with cM;H2 = cM;H .
Aggregating the individual demand (3), the aggregate demand (that is, the demand
facing a firm) is qij  Ljqcij . With trade cost  > 1, firms price-discriminate between the
regions. Thus, maximizing i = ii + ij is equivalent to
max
pij
ij = (pij    ijc) qij for j = 1; 2:
Therefore,
pij =
"ij
"ij   1 ijc =
pij
2pij   pmj
 ijc =
1
2
 
pmj +  ijc

(6)
qij = Lj

pmj

  pij


=
Lj
2
 
pmj    ijc

:
Let cDi and cXi denote cutoff cost levels in the local market and the export market for
firms in region i. Note that those cutoffs are independent of firm types. Then, cDi = pmi
and  ijcXi = pmj . So cXi  ij = cDj . The equilibrium profit and revenue for a firm from i with
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c in market j (if it sells there) are
ij =
Lj
4
 
cDj    ijc
2 (7)
sij (c) =
Lj
4
 
cDj
2   ( ijc)2 : (8)
Moreover, the firm’s mark-up in market j (if any) is
ij (c) = pij (c)   ijc =
1
2
 
pmj    ijc

: (9)
5.1.3 Entry
The products available in region i consist of those locally produced and those imported:X
s2fH;Fg
NE;si G
s
i
 
cDi

+
X
s2fH;Fg
NE;sj G
s
j
 
cXj

= Ni. (10)
By (4) and (10), we have
Pi = Ni
2 + 1
2 ( + 1)
cDi . (11)
Combining the expression for the choke price with (11), we can solve for the number of
products available in region i:
Ni =
2 ( + 1) 

  cDi
cDi
: (12)
Let    , and thus  is a measure of trade openness. Using (10) and (12), the numbers
of entrants are
NE;H1 =
2 ( + 1) 

cM;H1

 (1  2)
 
  cD1
(cD1 )
+1
     c
D
2
(cD2 )
+1
!
 KF
 
cM;H1
cM;F
!
(13)
NE;H2 =
2 ( + 1) 

cM;H2

 (1  2)
 
  cD2
(cD2 )
+1
     c
D
1
(cD1 )
+1
!
: (14)
Together with cXi  ij = cDj , each firm’s expected profit gross on their capital rental is
E (si ) =
Z cDi
0
sii (c) dG
s
i (c) +
Z cXi
0
sij (c) dG
s
i (c) =
Li
 
cDi
+2
+ Lj
 
cDj
+2
2 ( + 1) ( + 2)

cM;si
 : (15)
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Competition for capital equates the capital rental rate to that expected profit. That is,
rHi = E
 
Hi

and rF1 = E
 
F1

.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis
5.2.1 Equilibrium with fixed spatial distribution of firms
Before the analysis of equilibrium spatial distribution of firms, we first express the equi-
librium conditions when the spatial distribution is fixed, that is, when  is fixed. Equation
(5) and NE;H1 +N
E;H
2 = K
H together imply that
NE;H1 =
KHGH2
 
cD2
 KFGF1  cD1 
GH2 (c
D
2 ) +G
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Equating (13) and (16), as well as (14) and (17), we obtain
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 : (19)
For a given , the two cutoffs cD1 and cD2 are determined by the above two equilibrium
conditions.
5.2.2 Equilibrium spatial distribution of firms
Let H ()  E  H1 ()  E  H2 (), where  2 [;1) with   KFGF1 (cD1 )KHGH2 (cD2 ) , as the lower
and upper bounds, correspond to the cases where all domestic firms are in region 2 and
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in region 1, respectively.24 We define equilibria following the standard approach (e.g.,
Krugman 1991; Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse 2002). That is, an interior equilibrium , e,
must satisfy H (e) = 0. A corner equilibrium e !1 (f e = 1) exists if lim!1H () >
0. Similarly, a corner equilibrium e =  exists if H () < 0.
From (15), we have
H () =

cM;H1
cM;H2
 
  

L1
 
cD1
+2
+

cM;H1
cM;H2
 
  1

L2
 
cD2
+2
2 ( + 1) ( + 2)

cM;H2
 :
First recall that c
M;H
1
cM;H2
< 1 due to technology diffusion. If c
M;H
1
cM;H2
  1 , then

cM;H1
cM;H2
 
  1
and H () > 0 for all . Hence, full agglomeration (f e = 1) occurs when c
M;H
1
cM;H2
  1 . Any
interior equilibrium e must satisfy H (e) = 0. Note that this also implies equal rental
rates for domestic capital: rH1 = rH2  rH . The condition H = 0 implies that
cD2
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=
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L2
 1
+2
: (20)
Note that for a given KF , h is exogenously determined. Suppose the two regions’ pop-
ulations are the same. Then, (20) implies that cD2 > cD1 . Because foreign firms are more
productive, the domestic firms in region 1 are also more productive due to technology
diffusion. Together with positive trade cost ( > 1;  < 1), firms in region 1 being more
productive ensures that competition and selection are both more fierce in region 1, result-
ing in cD1 < cD2 . Observe that h is strictly decreasing in c
M;H
1 , which is strictly decreasing
in KF ; so h is strictly increasing in KF . FDI deregulation (an increase in KF ) therefore
widens the difference between the two selection cutoffs, as the market in region 1 becomes
more competitive. When the population sizes are different, the larger the population ra-
24When all domestic firms are in region 2, the levels of cD1 and cD2 are determined by
2 ( + 1) 

cM;H1

 (1  2)
 
  cD1 
cD1
+1      cD2 
cD2
+1
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 KF
 
cM;H1
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!
= 0
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
cM;H2

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+1      cD1 
cD1
+1
!
= KH ,
which are derived from (13) and (14). It can be shown that this occurs when L1=L2 is below a certain level,
causing H () < 0.
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tio L1=L2, the larger the gap between the two cutoffs. Also, the greater the technology
diffusion, the larger the gap.
Letting ` L2L1 , and using N
E;H
1 +N
E;H
2 = K
H , (13), (14), and (20), we have

 
1 + `h
  cD1  1 + `h2
(cD1 )
+1
=
(1  2)
cM;H1

  

cM;H2
 

KH +KF

cM;H1
cM;F

2 ( + 1) 
: (21)
The selection cutoff cD1 is the only endogenous variable in (21), which allows the following
characterization.
Proposition 1. When c
M;H
1
cM;H2
  1 , the equilibrium where all firms agglomerate in region 1 (f e =
1) is the only equilibrium. Let h be defined by (20). When 
1
 <
cM;H1
cM;H2
< 1 and
KH +KF

cM;H1
cM;F


cM;H1

  

cM;H2
  (1  2)2 ( + 1)  > (h  1)h ; (22)
there exists a unique interior equilibrium. Moreover, f e  1=2 if and only if h  1.
Proof. The proposition is already proven for the full-agglomeration case. Define F (c) 
(1+`h) c(1+`h2)
c+1
, where c 2  0; 
h

. The domain is
 
0; 
h

because 0 < cD1 <  and cD2 =
hcD1 < . It can be shown that F (c) is strictly decreasing on
 
0; 
h

. Thus, the left-hand side
of (21) strictly decreases from infinity to (h 1)h


> 0. Observe that

cM;H1

 

cM;H2

> 0
if and only if c
M;H
1
cM;H2
> 
1
 . Thus, if c
M;H
1
cM;H2
> 
1
 and (22) holds, then there exists a unique
equilibrium cD1 that satisfies (21), which is a condition for interior equilibrium. If
cM;H1
cM;H2
>

1
 but (22) fails, then no interior equilibrium exists. Observe that
e =
KFGF1
 
cD1

+NE;H1 G
H
1
 
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H
2 (c
D
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We know that cD1 <  and cD2 = hcD1 < , and thus cD1 < minf; hg. If h > 1,
e =
0@ 1  2 
1
h
+1  cD2
 cD1
  
  
1Ah  > (1  2)
h 1   h   h
   H (h) ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that cD1 < cD2 <  in equilibrium and that H (h)
is increasing in h over the domain

1;  
1
+1

. Note here that h    1+1 is not permissible
because the term
 
1
h
+1 ( cD2 )
( cD1 )
   in (23) must be positive, and cD1 < cD2 when h > 1.
Hence, e > H (1) = 1 and f e = 
e
1+e
> 1
2
. Similarly, if h < 1, we have cD1 > cD2 , and
thus e =
0@ 1 2
( 1h)
+1  cD2
 cD1
 
  
1A  1
h

<

(1 2)
( 1h)
+1 
  
 
1
h
  H (h), which is increasing
in (0; 1), and thus e < H (1) = 1 and f e = 
e
1+e
< 1
2
. Also, if h = 1, then e = 1 and
f e = 1=2.
Note that condition (22) serves as a regularity condition that guarantees the existence
of an interior equilibrium. Two key observations are in order. First, the ratio c
M;H
1
cM;H2
in-
versely measures technology diffusion as it is negatively affected by KF . Thus, given
 2 (0; 1), for an initial KF such that  1 < cM;H1
cM;H2
, increasing KF from the initial level will
eventually cause c
M;H
1
cM;H2
switch from larger than 
1
 to smaller than 
1
 , and hence switch the
equilibrium from partial to full agglomeration. This demonstrates that FDI can encourage
agglomeration by attracting domestic firms to region 1.
Note too, that if  = 1 ( = 1), the competition pressure a firm faces is the same re-
gardless of where the firm is located. Thus, transport cost  measures the degree in which
locations matter in terms of competition pressure. Given KF (hence given c
M;H
1
cM;H2
), increas-
ing the transport cost between the two regions (reducing ) may switch the equilibrium
from full to partial agglomeration. When  is high, location matters for competition pres-
sure, and firms tend to spread themselves among the locations.
Even though Proposition 1 shows the importance of the composite parameter h in
determining the location pattern f e, we still lack an analysis on the comparative statics of
KF on f e in a continuous range, say, when h > 1. Due to the complexity of the model,
no analytical result is available and we resort to numerical analysis for such comparative
statics.
We consider three cases based on the relative amounts of foreign and domestic capital.
In all the cases, we let L1 = L2.
1. Hold KH fixed and increase KF only. This is numerical comparative statics of an
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Figure 3: Comparative statics of KF on f e
influx of foreign capital (Shenzhen and Iskandar vs 2002 FDI deregulation).
2. Increase KH and KF at the same rate. This is numerical comparative statics of the
overall scale of the industry.
3. Increase KH faster than KF . Numerical comparative statics of the overall scale of
the industry when domestic capital increases faster than foreign investment.
Figure 3 shows that f e first increases with KF and then decreases, and that this is true
for different levels of KH .25 Such non-monotonic patterns demonstrate a key intuition:
the increasing part corresponds to the case where KF is small but its increase promotes
agglomeration sharply because of technology diffusion. The decreasing part shows up
eventually when KF becomes even larger as the competition becomes more intense and
there are diminishing returns to technology diffusion. The curves with small KH can
be thought of as mimicking the case where the economy is small overall (e.g., China in
1979). In such a case, the slope of the increasing part is particularly steep as technology
diffusion plays a large role. The curves with large KH can be thought of as mimicking
the case where the overall scale of the economy has grown large. In such a case when KF
is also large, we still see a negative effect of FDI on agglomeration of firms even when
the slope is flatter than the cases where KH is small. This corresponds to our empirical
findings.
25The parameters used for plotting Figure 4 are L1 = L2 = 1,  = 5,  = 2,  = 5,  = 10,  = 1,  = 2:2,
cM;H = 2, cM;F = 1:75. Here, KF increases from 0 to 10, and there are four values of KH : 3; 5; 7 and 10.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics on f e when KF and KH both grow
The left and right panels of Figure 4 plot the second and third cases.26 They show what
would occur if the effect of FDI deregulation were to increase not only the foreign firms
but also the domestic firms (through various complementary channels). These patterns
are robust. Note also that the reactions are smaller in the right panel than in the left
because the amount of foreign capital is relatively less in the right panel, mitigating the
effect of technology diffusion.
5.3 Evidence on Competition Effect
As competition is the main mechanism explaining our empirical findings, it is crucial to
test this mechanism empirically. In all of our numerical comparative statics in the above
theoretical model, cD1 and cD2 both decrease in response to FDI deregulation (increase in
KF ). Consequently, according to (7), (8), and (9), firms’ mark-ups, profits, and revenues
decrease in both regions and for both types of firms. These are natural reflections of
increased competitive pressure. Thus, our first mechanism test is to examine whether
there are negative effects of FDI deregulation on markups, profits, and sales.
Firm sales and profits can be extracted directly from the data. Firm markups are es-
timated using the methodology developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).27 The
estimation uses the following DD specification:
26Except for the amount of capital, the parameters used in both panels are same: L1 = L2 = 1,  = 5,
 = 2,  = 5,  = 10,  = 1,  = 2:2, cM;H = 2, cM;F = 1:75. Initial home capital KH0 = 5 and initial foreign
capital KF0 = 0 in both panels. In the left panel, home and foreign capital increase at the same rate, that is:
Kst = K
s
0 + t, where s 2 fH;Fg, and time t 2 (0; 10). In the right panel, home capital increases faster than
foreign capital: KFt = KF0 + t, and KHt = KH0 + 20t with time t 2 (0; 10).
27See Appendix C for details of the firm markup estimation.
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yfit = f + Treatmenti  Post02t + X0it + 	
0
ft+ t + "fit; (24)
where f , i, and t here denote the firm, 4-digit industry, and year, respectively. yfit mea-
sures the performance (markups, profits or sales) of firm f in industry i in year t; f and
t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively; and "fit is the error term. We control for the
time-varying industry characteristicsXit as in the benchmark estimation (1). The vector of
time-varying firm characteristics 	ft includes firm size (measured by firm employment),
capital intensity (measured by the ratio of capital to labor), intermediate inputs, and firm
ownership (measured by a state-owned enterprise dummy and a foreign-invested en-
terprise dummy). To address the potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we
cluster the standard errors at the industry level.
The estimation results are presented in Table 6, with Panel A for the sample of all firms
and Panel B for the sample of domestic firms only.28 Consistently, we find that FDI dereg-
ulation has a negative and statistically significant effect on firm markups, profits, and
sales. These results are consistent with our model predictions, lending strong empirical
support to the theoretical model.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Our theory focuses on China with the rest of the world appearing only as the exoge-
nous source of foreign capital. It has emphasized as a mechanism that an influx of foreign
capital intensifies domestic competition. Another way to look into such a mechanism
is to distinguish exporting firms from non-exporters. The non-exporters face predomi-
nantly domestic competition, whereas the exporters also face competition on foreign turf.
Any competitive impact of FDI deregulation should thus be more pronounced for the
non-exporters than for exporters.
Estimation results testing this conjecture are presented in Table 7, with Column 1 for
non-exporters and Column 2 for exporters. With the non-exporters sample the effect of
FDI on industrial agglomeration is statistically negative, and slightly larger in magnitude
than in the benchmark estimation result shown in Column 8 of Table 3. The FDI deregu-
lation effect on industrial agglomeration using the sample of exporting firms is negative
with much smaller magnitude and statistically insignificant.
[Insert Table 7 here]
28Similar to the empirical literature on FDI, we also look at the impacts of FDI on domestic firms. Com-
petition may have a stronger impact on domestic firms than on foreign firms because domestic firms are
more mobile within China.
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Another concern about the mechanism is what if the foreign firms mostly produce
for export instead of selling on the domestic market and thus do not actually impose
competitive pressure on domestic firms. The proposed mechanism would also be under-
mined if FDI deregulation induces more export-oriented foreign firms to enter China or
encourages incumbent foreign firms to export more. To examine these possibilities, we
consider the changes in export intensity of the foreign firms in both the treatment and
control groups. The following table reports the export intensity in each group before and
after 2002.
Before 2002 After 2002
Treatment Group 0:327 0:348
Control Group 0:398 0:400
The first observation is that foreign firms’ domestic sales account for between 60 and 70%
of their revenue during the entire period of the data. Second, the export intensity of the
foreign firms in the control group hardly changes after the FDI deregulation; the increase
in export intensity in the treatment group is also quite slight. That is, the foreign firms in
the deregulated industries still sell mainly to the domestic market after deregulation.
We turn to the effect of the FDI deregulation on the foreign firms’ export intensity,
reported in Column 3 of Table 7 using the same benchmark specification as in Column
8 of Table 3: here is no statistically significant effect. These results and those in Table
2 indicate that FDI deregulation results in fiercer competition pressure on the domestic
firms.
5.4 An Alternative Explanation: Spatial Political Competition?
An alternative explanation for the finding of the negative effect of FDI deregulation on
industrial agglomeration arises from a political-economy perspective. Local governments
have an incentive to lure business to help increase GDP and employment. The incentive
to attract foreign firms could be particularly strong because of the potential for spillovers.
FDI deregulation opens up new opportunities for the local governments to try to get FDI
in the newly-deregulated industries. In this spatial political competition, less-agglomerated
and less-developed regions may be particularly keen to seize this new opportunity. Once
the foreign firms become more dispersed because of this, domestic firms may follow them
in search of technology diffusion. To test whether this story is plausible, we focus on the
location pattern of foreign firms. In particular, we calculate the EG index for the foreign
firms in each industry, and regress using the same benchmark specification (Column 8
of Table 3). If political competition is a factor, there should be more dispersion in the
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deregulated industries. The result is reported in Column 4 of Table 7. The coefficient is
insignificant, so the estimation results do not support the political competition explana-
tion.
6 The Effect of FDI and Industrial Agglomeration on In-
dustrial Growth
Our aforementioned analyses show a significant negative effect of FDI deregulation on
industrial agglomeration. As mentioned in the introduction, one fundamental reason of
investigating FDI and industrial agglomeration is their implications for economic growth.
Thus, we are interested in knowing whether or not industrial growth rate is affected by
these two factors, which, as we have shown, are not orthogonal. The technology dif-
fusion assumption implies that FDI is conducive to industrial growth. The deregulated
industries may also grow faster because the deregulation allows more foreign capital to
enter, which may also attract domestic capital to accumulate. Moreover, even though the
competition channel may induce firms to disperse spatially, the accompanying stronger
selection implies higher average productivity, which is also conducive to industrial ag-
glomeration. The various agglomeration economies (even though they are not explicitly
modeled here) are positive externalities, and thus they are by definition conducive to
growth as well. We thus expect that both FDI and industrial agglomeration would en-
hance industrial growth.
The FDI deregulation event allows exploring this using a decomposition framework
in the spirit of Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013). The decomposition exercise involves
three steps. First, we regress the industrial growth (measured by the growth rate of in-
dustry value-added, i.e., the difference in the logarithm of value-added between t and
t  1 for a one-year growth rate, and the difference in value-added between t and t  3 for
a three-year growth rate) on the FDI regulation changes using the same specification as in
the baseline estimation (1). This regression produces an estimated coefficient ^
total
for the
total effect of FDI deregulation. In the second step, industrial agglomeration (measured
by the EG index) is added to the previous regression, yielding an estimate ^
net
of the total
FDI deregulation effect net of the changes in economic growth induced by FDI deregu-
lation via industrial agglomeration. Lastly, we calculate the relative contribution of the
industrial agglomeration to the total effect of FDI deregulation on economic growth as
^
total ^net
^
total  100 percent.
Table 8 presents the estimation results. Note that the estimated coefficients of Treatmenti
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Post02t are positive and significant, indicating that FDI does promote industrial growth.
The facts that the estimated coefficients are smaller when the EG index is not controlled
than those when the EG index is controlled and that FDI deregulation induces disper-
sion imply that industrial agglomeration is conducive to industrial growth, confirming
our hypothesis. The decomposition further indicates that 16 to 19% of industrial growth
rate is lost due to the dispersion caused by FDI deregulation. We discuss related policy
implications in the conclusion.
[Insert Table 8 here]
7 Conclusion
By using a DD estimation, this paper finds that the FDI deregulation in 2002 in China
on average caused geographic dispersion of industries. We propose a theory based on
the interaction of technology diffusion and competition effect to explain when such a
finding may arise and also the situation when the influx of foreign capital can encourage
agglomeration. Empirical evidence supports the mechanism in the theory.
Our empirical and theoretical findings render some policy implications, especially in
designing industrial districts and when coupled with trade policy, such as various special
economic zones in China and similar place-based policies elsewhere. FDI is often thought
of as having technology spillover effect on domestic firms, and this should foster agglom-
eration of firms and make the place-based policy successful. Our findings suggest that
whether this is true or not depends on the stage of development. It may likely be true
in early stages of development, but it may turn out to be against firms’ incentive in later
stages.
Our empirical investigation on industrial growth echoes our main empirical findings
and the theory. We find that FDI deregulation increases industrial growth rate, but the
dispersion induced by FDI de-regulation reduces the positive effect of FDI on growth rate
by 16 to 19%. This suggests that combining FDI-promoting and agglomeration-promotion
policies (such as SEZs) may be worthwhile because FDI influx may cause dispersion and
thereby dampen growth potentials. Of course, we are not taking any stance on any spe-
cific place-based policy, but it is also important to note the possibility that an agglomera-
tion stimulated in a few places may induce an overall dispersion of the industry.
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Appendix
A Data on FDI Regulations in China
The 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment
Industries are compared to obtain information about changes in FDI regulations upon
China’s accession to the WTO. The 2002 version rather than the 2004, 2007, or 2011 version
is used because the 2002 revision of the Catalogue was substantial and in strict accordance
with the commitments made in China’s WTO accession. There were very few changes in
2004, and the 2007 and 2011 modifications are beyond the period studied.
In the Catalogue, products are classified into four categories: (i) products where for-
eign direct investment was supported (the supported category), (ii) products (not listed in
the Catalogue) where foreign direct investment was permitted (the permitted category),
(iii) products where foreign direct investment was restricted (the restricted category), and
finally, (iv) products where foreign direct investment was prohibited (the prohibited cat-
egory).
Comparing the 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue allowed identifying for each
product whether there had been a change in the FDI regulations upon China’s accession
to the WTO. Each product could then be assigned to a category:
 FDI became more welcome (the encouraged products). For example, “dairy prod-
ucts” was listed in the supported category in the 2002 Catalogue, but listed in the
permitted category in the 1997 Catalogue, so FDI in “dairy products” was encour-
aged.
 FDI became less welcome (the discouraged products). For example, “ethylene propy-
lene rubber” was listed as supported in the 1997 Catalogue, but listed as permitted
in 2002, so FDI in “ethylene propylene rubber” was discouraged.
 No change in FDI regulations between 1997 and 2002. For example, “Casting and
forging roughcasts for automobiles and motorcycles” was listed in the supported
category in both the 1997 and 2002 Catalogues, so there is no change in FDI in this
product.
Table A1 lists a matrix of all of the possible changes in product categories (supported,
restricted, prohibited, and permitted) between 1997 and 2002 with the corresponding clas-
sifications in the changes in FDI regulations (encouraged, discouraged, or no change).
Then, we aggregate the changes in FDI regulations from the Catalogue product level to
the ASIF industry level. As the product classifications used by the Catalogue are different
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from the industry classifications used in the ASIF data, we convert the product classifica-
tions of the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries into the 4-digit
Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) of 2003 using the Industrial Product Catalogue from
the National Bureau of Statistics of China.29 As the Chinese industry classification was re-
vised in 2003, we use a concordance table from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012)
to create a harmonized Chinese Industry Classification that is consistent over the entire
1998–2007 period. As the product classifications of the Catalogue are generally more dis-
aggregated than the 4-digit Chinese Industry Classifications of the ASIF, it is possible that
two or more products from the Catalogue are sorted into the same 4-digit CIC industry
of the ASIF. The aggregation process leads to four possible scenarios:
1. (FDI) Encouraged Industries: For all of the possible Catalogue products in a 4-
digit CIC industry, there was either an improvement in the FDI regulations or no
change. For example, four sub-categories under “Synthetic Fiber Monomer (Poly-
merization)” (CIC code: 2653) experienced improvements in FDI regulations (listed
in the restricted category in the 1997 Catalogue, but the supported category in the
2002 Catalogue): “Pure Terephthalic Acid (PTA)” (CIC sub-code: 26530101), “Acry-
lonitrile” (26530103), “Caprolactam” (26530104), and “Nylon 66 Salt” (26530299);
and there was no change in FDI regulations for the other sub-categories. “Synthetic
fiber monomer (polymerization)” is thus an (FDI) encouraged industry.
2. (FDI) Discouraged Industries: For all of the possible Catalogue products in a 4-digit
CIC industry, there was either a deterioration in FDI regulations or no change. For
example, one sub-category in “Food Additives” (CIC code: 1494) experienced a de-
terioration in FDI regulations (listed in the permitted category in the 1997 Catalogue
but listed in the restricted category in the 2002 Catalogue): “Synthetic Sweeteners”
(CIC sub-code: 14940103), but there were no changes in FDI regulations for the other
sub-categories. “Food Additives” is thus an (FDI) discouraged industry.
3. No-Change Industries: There was no change in FDI regulations for any of the pos-
sible Catalogue products under a 4-digit CIC industry. “Edible Vegetable Oil” (CIC
code: 1331) is one example. All of the sub-categories were permitted in both the
1997 Catalogue and the 2002 Catalogue. “Edible Vegetable Oil” is thus a no-change
industry.
4. Mixed Industries: Some of the products in a 4-digit CIC industry experienced an
29The Industrial Product Catalogue lists each CIC 4-digit industry and its sub-categories at the 8-digit
disaggregated product level.
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improvement in FDI regulations, but some had tighter FDI regulation. For exam-
ple, under “Crude Chemical Medicine” (CIC code: 2710), the FDI regulations for
one sub-category (“Vitamin B6” (CIC sub-code: 27100404)) improved (listed in the
restricted category in the 1997 Catalogue, but the permitted category in the 2002 Cat-
alogue), but the FDI regulations for one sub-category (“Vitamin E” (CIC sub-code:
27100408)) deteriorated (listed in the permitted category in the 1997 Catalogue, but
in the restricted category in the 2002 Catalogue). “Crude Chemical Medicine” is
thus a mixed industry.
B Determinants of Changes in FDI Regulations1
As mentioned in the main text, the changes in FDI regulations upon China’s WTO acces-
sion in 2002 may not be randomly determined. In this appendix, we carefully examine the
determinants of the changes in FDI regulations upon China’s WTO accession. According
to the “Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment” issued by the State
Council, there are several reasons why the government chose to modify the Catalogue
and relaxed the FDI regulations in 2002. The government sought to make its domestic
firms competitive in the era of globalization and promote industry upgrades and exports.
Meanwhile, the government aimed to protect infant industries in their early stages and
encourage industrial clustering so as to boost development in those industries. Finally,
the government also cared about the impact of FDI deregulations on the domestic labor
market, for instance current employment and wages, which are critical for maintaining
social stability in the country.
To account for the above possible considerations of China’s government in relaxing
its FDI regulations, we include seven variables: new product intensity (the ratio of new
products in total output), export intensity (the ratio of exports to total output), number
of firms, industrial clustering (the Ellison–Glaeser index), average age of firms, average
employment, and average wage per worker.
We regress the changes in FDI regulations (a dummy variable taking value 1 if FDI in
an industry became more welcome, and 0 otherwise) on the aforementioned FDI determi-
nants and found that four variables are statistically significant: (1) new product intensity
is found to have a positive effect; (2) export intensity is found to have a negative effect; (3)
number of firms is found to have a positive effect; and (4) average age of firms is found
to have a negative effect.
1This appendix was reproduced with modifications from Appendix A in Lu, Tao, and Zhu (2017).
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C Estimation of Markups
Estimation Framework.—To recover firm-level markups, we follow the approach devel-
oped by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Consider that a firm f at time t produces
output using the following production technology:
Qft = Qt(Lft; Kft;Mft; !ft); (C.1)
where Qft is the firm’s physical output and Lft; Kft;Mft are the firm’s physical inputs of
labor, capital, and intermediate input, respectively. !ft denotes firm productivity. Qt() is
assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable with respect to all of its elements.
Consider a firm’s cost minimization problem and the associated Lagrangian function
for firm f at time t:
L(Lft; Kft;Mft; ft) = wftLft + rftKft + pmftMft (C.2)
+ft(Qft  Qt(Lft; Kft;Mft; !ft));
wherewft, rft, and pmft denote the firm’s wage rate, the rental price of capital, and the price
of intermediate input, respectively. The estimation of markup hinges on the factor that
the firm can freely adjust. China’s capital and labor markets are heavily regulated and
resource misallocations are severe, so intermediate input is taken as the optimal input free
of any adjustment costs (Lu and Yu 2015). Thus, the first-order condition for intermediate
input is
@L
@Mft
= pmft   ft
@Qft
@Mft
= 0; (C.3)
where ft =
@Lft
@Qft
is the marginal cost of production at a given level of output.
Rearranging equation (C.3) and multiplying both sides by Mft
Qft
, we obtain
@Qft
@Mft
Mft
Qft
=
1
ft
pmftMft
Qft
: (C.4)
The firm markup is defined as price divided by marginal cost, that is, ft  Pftft . Using
equation (C.4), the firm-level markup can be expressed as
ft = 
m
ft
pmftMft
PftQft
= mft(
m
ft)
 1; (C.5)
where mft is the output elasticity of the intermediate input and 
m
ft is the share of expen-
diture on intermediate input. The share of expenditure on intermediate input is available
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from the firm-level data. Computing firm-level markup then requires an estimate of the
production function to obtain the output elasticity of the intermediate input.
Production Function Estimation.—Consider the following translog production function
(in logarithmic form):
yft = llft + kkft + mmft + lll
2
ft + kkk
2
ft + mmm
2
ft + lklftkft (A1)
+lmlftmft + kmkftmft + kmlftkftmft + !ft + ft; (C.6)
where yft is the logarithm of firm output, lft, kft, and mft are the logarithms of the inputs
employment, capital, and materials. !ft is firm productivity, and ft is measurement error
and any unanticipated shocks to output.
Obtaining consistent production function estimates = (l; k; m; ll; kk; mm; lk; lm; km; lkm)
requires controlling for unobserved productivity shocks potentially leading to simultane-
ity and selection biases. A control function based on a static input demand function is
used as a proxy for the unobserved productivity.
The control function approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is applied. The following material demand function is used
as a proxy for the unobserved productivity:
mft = mt (!ft; lft; kft) : (A2)
Inverting (A2) yields the control function for productivity:
!ft = ht (lft; kft;mft) :
In the first stage, unanticipated shocks and measurement errors (ft) are purged by
estimating the following equation:
yft = t (lft; kft;mft) + ft: (A3)
That yields a predicted output (^ft).
(A1) and (A3) from the first stage estimation can then be used to express productivity:
!ft () = ^ft   llft   kkft   mmft   lll2ft   kkk2ft   mmm2ft (A4)
 lklftkft   lmlftmft   kmkftmft   kmlftkftmft: (C.7)
To estimate the production function coefficients , the technique of Ackerberg, Caves,
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and Frazer (2015) is applied and moments are formed based on innovation in the produc-
tivity shock ft in law of motion for productivity:
!ft = g (!ft 1) + ft:
Using (A4), !ft () is non-parametrically regressed against g (!ft 1) to obtain the in-
novation term ft () = !ft ()  E (!ft () j!ft 1 ()).
The moment conditions used to estimate the production function coefficients are
E
 
ft () Yft

= 0;
where Yft contains lagged labor and materials, current capital, and their interactions.30
Once the production function coefficients ^ =

^l; ^k; ^m; ^ll; ^kk; ^mm; ^lk; ^lm; ^km; ^lkm

have been estimated, the output elasticity of intermediate input is measured as bmft =bm + 2bmm ~mft + blm~lft + bkm~kft + blkm~lft~kft.
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(1) (2) (3)
Industry 1998−2007 1998−2001 2002−2007
Food processing 0.0506 0.0531 0.0490
Food manufacturing 0.0186 0.0181 0.0189
Beverage manufacturing 0.0396 0.0428 0.0375
Tobacco processing −0.0001 0.0007 −0.0006
Textile industry 0.0476 0.0392 0.0532
Garments & other fiber products 0.0136 0.0109 0.0154
Leather, furs, down & related products 0.0640 0.0427 0.0781
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber & straw products 0.0235 0.0229 0.0239
Furniture manufacturing 0.0122 0.0084 0.0145
Papermaking & paper products 0.0499 0.0989 0.0173
Printing industry 0.0145 0.0205 0.0105
Cultural, educational & sports goods 0.0211 0.0153 0.0249
Petroleum processing & coking 0.0065 −0.0113 0.0184
Raw chemical materials & chemical products 0.0348 0.0294 0.0384
Medical & pharmaceutical products 0.0069 0.0050 0.0081
Chemical fiber 0.0220 −0.0044 0.0396
Rubber products 0.0147 0.0073 0.0195
Plastic products 0.0294 0.0230 0.0336
Nonmetal mineral products 0.0403 0.0297 0.0473
Smelting & pressing of ferrous metals 0.0157 0.0122 0.0181
Smelting & pressing of nonferrous metals 0.0654 0.0551 0.0723
Metal products 0.0347 0.0288 0.0387
Ordinary machinery 0.0122 0.0099 0.0137
Special purpose equipment 0.0220 0.0009 0.0360
Transport equipment 0.0316 0.0126 0.0434
Electric equipment & machinery 0.0271 0.0195 0.0321
Electronic & telecommunications equipment 0.0417 0.0234 0.0528
Instruments, meters, cultural & office equipment 0.0259 0.0197 0.0300
Table 1: Calculated EG Indexes by Industry
Note: An EG index for each 2-digit industry is calculated over the 1998-2007 period, the pre-WTO 1998-2001 period,
and the post-WTO 2002-2007 period.
(1) (2) (3)
1998−2001 2002−2007
Percentage change
(%)
Treatment 0.244 0.312 27.99
Control 0.217 0.250 15.46
Treatment 0.131 0.161 22.78
Control 0.192 0.208 8.48
Table 2: FDI Inflows Before and After WTO Accession
Note: Foreign equity share in Panel A and share of foreign firms in Panel B, in the treatment and
control groups, calculated over the pre-WTO 1998–2001 period, the post-WTO 2002–2007 period,
and their percentage changes.
Panel A. Foreign equity share for the treatment and control groups
Panel B. Share of number of foreign firms for the treatment and control groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment × Post02 −0.020** −0.018** −0.019** −0.020** −0.021** −0.021** −0.022*** −0.023***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076 4,076
Additional controls:
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control for tariff reductions no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control for SOE reforms no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Control for special economic zones no no no no yes yes yes yes
Control for western development program no no no no no yes yes yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics no no no no no no yes yes
Control for vertical FDI no no no no no no yes yes
Table 3: Main Results
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. Determinants of FDI regulation changes include interactions of the year dummies with new product intensity,
export intensity, number of firms, industry age, and changes in the output share of state-owned enterprises between 1998 and 2001. Tariff reductions include interactions of the year dummies
with output tariff, input tariff, and export tariff. SOE reforms include interactions of the year dummies with the output of state-owned enterprises as a share of total output. Special economic
zones include interactions of the year dummies with the output of SEZ firms as a proportion of total output. Western development program include interactions of the year dummies with the
output of firms in the western region as a proportion of the total output. The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial productivity, the ratio of intermediate inputs to output, the wage
premium, average firm size, and the fraction of employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI includes backward and forward FDI. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level
respectively.
Dependent variable: industrial agglomeration (EG index, prefecture level)
EG index
(prefecture level);
Columbia
instruments
Discouraged
industries included
in the control group
EG index (county
level)
EG index
(prefecture level)
EG index (county
level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment × Post02 −0.143** −0.022** −0.014** −0.023*** −0.014**
(0.063) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Treatment × One Year Before WTO Accession −0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 4,066 4,136 4,076 4,076 4,076
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 8.40** − − − −
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 91.75*** − − − −
Hansen's J statistic 3.90 − − − −
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.14 − − − −
Additional controls:
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes yes yes yes yes yes
Control for tariff reductions yes yes yes yes yes
Control for SOE reforms yes yes yes yes yes
Control for special economic zones yes yes yes yes yes
Control for western development program yes yes yes yes yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Control for vertical FDI yes yes yes yes yes
Table 4: Robustness Checks
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. Determinants of FDI regulation changes include interactions of the year
dummies with new product intensity, export intensity, number of firms, industry age, and changes in the output share of state-owned enterprises between 1998
and 2001. Tariff reductions include interactions of the year dummies with output tariff, input tariff, and export tariff. SOE reforms include interactions of the
year dummies with the output of state-owned enterprises as a share of total output. Special economic zones include interactions of the year dummies with the
output of SEZ firms as a proportion of total output. Western development program include interactions of the year dummies with the output of firms in the
western region as a proportion of the total output. The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial productivity, the ratio of intermediate inputs to output,
the wage premium, average firm size, and the fraction of employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI includes backward and forward FDI. In column 1, a post-
WTO dummy interacted with industry-level export intensity, number of firms and age calculated from Columbian firms sample 1981 to 1991 are used as
instruments for FDI regulation changes. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
Dependent variable: industrial agglomeration
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Log markups Log profits Log sales
Panel A. Full sample
Treatment × Post02 −0.041*** −0.034*** −0.023***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 1,724,823 1,429,489 1,761,629
Panel B. Domestic firms sample
Treatment × Post02 −0.037*** −0.035*** −0.025***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 1,363,524 1,152,490 1,395,898
Additional controls:
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes yes yes yes
Control for tariff reductions yes yes yes
Control for SOE reforms yes yes yes
Control for special economic zones yes yes yes
Control for western development program yes yes yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics yes yes yes
Control for vertical FDI yes yes yes
Control for time-varying firm characteristics yes yes yes
Table 5: Mechanism Test I
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. Determinants of FDI regulation
changes include interactions of the year dummies with new product intensity, export intensity, number of firms,
industry age, and changes in the output share of state-owned enterprises between 1998 and 2001. Tariff reductions
include interactions of the year dummies with output tariff, input tariff, and export tariff. SOE reforms include
interactions of the year dummies with the output of state-owned enterprises as a share of total output. Special
economic zones include interactions of the year dummies with the output of SEZ firms as a proportion of total
output. Western development program include interactions of the year dummies with the output of firms in the
western region as a proportion of the total output. The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial
productivity, the ratio of intermediate inputs to output, the wage premium, average firm size, and the fraction of
employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI includes backward and forward FDI. The time-varying firm
characteristics include firm size, capital-labor ratio, intermediate inputs, a state-owned enterprise dummy, and a
foreign-invested enterprise dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
Dependent variable: 
Industrial
agglomeration
(EG index)
Non-exporters Exporters Foreign firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post02 −0.025*** −0.011 0.011 −0.003
(0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 4,057 3,851 3,995 3,653
Additional controls:
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes yes yes yes yes
Control for tariff reductions yes yes yes yes
Control for SOE reforms yes yes yes yes
Control for special economic zones yes yes yes yes
Control for western development program yes yes yes yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics yes yes yes yes
Control for vertical FDI yes yes yes yes
Industrial agglomeration (EG index)
Table 6: Mechanism Test II
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. Determinants of FDI regulation changes include
interactions of the year dummies with new product intensity, export intensity, number of firms, industry age, and changes in the output
share of state-owned enterprises between 1998 and 2001. Tariff reductions include interactions of the year dummies with output tariff,
input tariff, and export tariff. SOE reforms include interactions of the year dummies with the output of state-owned enterprises as a
share of total output. Special economic zones include interactions of the year dummies with the output of SEZ firms as a proportion of
total output. Western development program include interactions of the year dummies with the output of firms in the western region as a
proportion of the total output. The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial productivity, the ratio of intermediate inputs to
output, the wage premium, average firm size, and the fraction of employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI includes backward and
forward FDI. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
Export intensity
(foreign firms)
EG index not included EG index included
Dependent variable:
Growth rate of industry value-added 0.041* 0.049** −19.27%
   (difference in the logarithm of value-added between t  and t-1 ) (0.021) (0.022)
Growth rate of industry value-added 0.107* 0.124** −16.62%
   (difference in the logarithm of value-added between t  and t-3 ) (0.057) (0.059)
Additional controls:
Industry fixed effects yes yes −
Year fixed effects yes yes −
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes yes yes −
Control for tariff reductions yes yes −
Control for SOE reforms yes yes −
Control for special economic zones yes yes −
Control for western development program yes yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics yes yes −
Control for vertical FDI yes yes −
Estimated coefficient of Treatment × Post02
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. The implied relative contribution is the relative contribution of
industrial agglomeration to the total effect of FDI deregulation on industrial growth. Determinants of FDI regulation changes include interactions of the
year dummies with new product intensity, export intensity, number of firms, industry age, and changes in the output share of state-owned enterprises
between 1998 and 2001. Tariff reductions include interactions of the year dummies with output tariff, input tariff, and export tariff. SOE reforms include
interactions of the year dummies with the output of state-owned enterprises as a share of total output. Special economic zones include interactions of the
year dummies with the output of SEZ firms as a proportion of total output. Western development program include interactions of the year dummies with
the output of firms in the western region as a proportion of the total output. The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial productivity, the ratio
of intermediate inputs to output, the wage premium, average firm size, and the fraction of employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI includes backward
and forward FDI. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
Table 7: Role of Industrial Agglomeration in Industrial Growth
Implied relative
contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supported
Category
Permitted
Category
Restricted
Category
Prohibited
Category
(1) SupportedCategory No change Less welcome Less welcome Less welcome
(2) PermittedCategory More welcome No change Less welcome Less welcome
(3) RestrictedCategory More welcome More welcome No Change Less welcome
(4) ProhibitedCategory More welcome More welcome More welcome No Change
Table A1: Changes in FDI regulations (product level) between 1997 and 2002
2002
1997
Export intensity 1.034***
(0.384)
Industry age 0.016**
(0.006)
Number of firms 0.019
(0.021)
Observations 4,066
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 8.40**
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 91.75***
Additional controls:
Industry fixed effects yes
Year fixed effects yes
Control for determinants of FDI regulation changes yes
Control for tariff reductions yes
Control for SOE reforms yes
Control for special economic zones yes
Control for western development program yes
Control for time-varying industry characteristics yes
Control for vertical FDI yes
Appendix Table 2: First-Stage of IV Estimation
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in
parentheses. Determinants of FDI regulation changes include
interactions of the year dummies with new product intensity, export
intensity, number of firms, industry age, and changes in the output share
of state-owned enterprises between 1998 and 2001. Tariff reductions
include interactions of the year dummies with output tariff, input tariff,
and export tariff. SOE reforms include interactions of the year dummies
with the output of state-owned enterprises as a share of total output.
Special economic zones include interactions of the year dummies with
the output of SEZ firms as a proportion of total output. Western
development program include interactions of the year dummies with the
output of firms in the western region as a proportion of the total output.
The time-varying industry characteristics are industrial productivity, the
ratio of intermediate inputs to output, the wage premium, average firm
size, and the fraction of employment in coastal areas. Vertical FDI
includes backward and forward FDI. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
Dependent variable: FDI regulation changes
